It was my first assignment as Chief Officer on a mainliner. An 18,000 TEU vessel on the Asia-North Europe route.
I received the stowage plan from the shore planner. Bending moments and shear forces at 97%.
I checked the maximum drafts for the next port. Everything was within limits, but 97% felt too high. On feeders, I’d always worked with 85% as my real maximum.
So I ballasted the double bottoms. Brought the stresses down to 85%. Safe. Comfortable.
We departed. I sent the sailing condition to the planner.
Ten minutes later, my phone rang.
”Chief, Why Did You Ballast?”
“Chief, the stresses were within limits. Why did you take ballast?”
I explained my reasoning. 97% was too close to the edge. I felt more comfortable at 85%. Standard practice from my feeder days.
There was a pause.
“Chief, yes we can enter the port with this draft. But after loading, the departure draft will be too deep.”
I hadn’t thought that far ahead.
“De-ballasting in port isn’t always possible. You know that. So our options are: cut cargo, which is impossible on a mainliner, or wait for a favorable tide window. That’s a 6-hour delay minimum.”
The planner continued.
“And there’s another problem. With the double bottoms full, your GM is too high. You won’t be able to load empties on top to optimize the tiers. We need to reach tier 9 on deck. With this GM, we can’t.”
I started to understand.
“If we can’t load correctly here, the cargo goes in the wrong positions. That means restows at every subsequent port. We’re talking tens of thousands of euros in terminal costs across the rotation.”
I didn’t know what to say.
“Discharge that ballast now. We need to depart with the original trim and stress condition.”
I discharged the ballast. We loaded to tier 9. The port operations ran smoothly.
But that phone call changed everything.
The Lesson
On feeders, I had been a good Chief Officer. I kept the vessel safe. I respected stability limits.
But I was optimizing for the wrong thing.
I reduced stress from 97% to 85%. It felt prudent. What I didn’t see:
- Departure draft too deep after loading
- De-ballast might be impossible or not optimal in some ports
- GM too high for empty containers on top tiers
- Cargo in the wrong positions
- Cascade of restows across the entire rotation
The shore planner saw all of it. They were thinking 10 ports ahead. I was thinking about this port.
I was focused on safety margins. They were focused on system performance.
My “safe” decision would have cost thousands of euros and disrupted an entire rotation.
The Call That Never Happens on Feeders
On a mainliner, if I ballast unnecessarily, someone calls within ten minutes.
On a feeder, who calls?
The Chief Officer makes the plan 3-4 hours before arrival. They check stability. Everything is within limits. They ballast to 85% because it feels safer.
Nobody calls.
The vessel arrives with 400 tons of unnecessary ballast. The terminal works around the deeper draft. Some slots stay empty because the weight margin is gone.
Total cost: maybe $3,000-5,000. Invisible. Unmeasured.
Multiply by 40-50 ports per year.
What Mainliners Do Differently
After that experience, I studied how shore planning actually worked:
Constant contact. The vessel and shore planner coordinate continuously. Every decision gets validated, even shifting a single container.
The planner sees what the vessel can’t. Booking forecasts. Terminal schedules. Tidal windows. Cargo for ports three calls ahead. Draft restrictions at every port in the rotation.
Optimization at rotation level. The planner might accept higher stresses today to enable maximum capacity at the final port.
Simulation is standard. On the last port before a long sea passage, the planner runs multiple scenarios with the Chief Officer, testing ballast discharge, optimizing trim, positioning the vessel for maximum fuel efficiency.
This isn’t occasional. This is every rotation, every vessel, every day.
”Within Limits” Isn’t “Optimal”
This took me years to understand:
Safety limits tell you what’s allowed. They don’t tell you what’s smart.
97% stress was optimal for that situation. It enabled correct loading, proper GM for high tiers, and departure draft within the tidal window.
85% stress was also allowed. But it would have triggered a cascade: wrong draft, wrong GM, wrong tier capacity, wrong cargo positions, restows at every port.
Both are “safe.” One is profitable. One is expensive.
The Chief Officer’s job is to validate that the plan is safe. But someone else needs to ensure it’s also efficient. Someone with time to run simulations. Someone who sees across the entire rotation.
On mainliners, that’s the shore planner.
On feeders, that someone doesn’t exist.
From Planner to Performance Manager
I don’t think “stowage planner” captures what this role does anymore.
What shore planning actually delivers is performance management:
- Maximum cargo intake at minimum cost
- Optimal trim for fuel efficiency
- Strategic restows that create capacity
- Crane splits optimized to reduce port time
- Ballast management across the rotation
- Draft and GM optimization for every port
- Coordination between vessel, terminal, and commercial teams
Maximum performance at minimum cost.
That’s not planning. That’s optimization.
The Question for Feeder Operators
If you’re managing feeders, ask yourself:
“Is what we’re doing actually correct?”
Not “is it safe”, of course it’s safe. Your Chief Officers are competent.
But is it optimal?
The major carriers asked this question 20 years ago. Their answer was shore-based planning.
You can’t afford their scale, the 40-person teams, the €2M software.
But you can afford the process. You can afford to separate safety from optimization. You can afford someone who calls when the ballast doesn’t make sense.
Don’t leave your Chief Officer alone with the plan. They have too much to do. It’s impossible to do what an experienced planner does in the time available.
Your Chief Officer validates safety. Someone else should ensure performance.
That’s not replacing the command team. That’s completing it.
Safety validates the plan. Shore planning optimizes it.